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Using the Minority Game model we study a broad spectrum of problems of market mechanism.
We study the role of different types of agents: producers, speculators as well as noise traders. The
central issue here is the information flow : producers feed in the information whereas speculators
make it away. How well each agent fares in the common game depends on the market conditions, as
well as their sophistication. Sometimes there is much to gain with little effort, sometimes great effort
virtually brings no more incremental gain. Market impact is shown to play also an important role,
a strategy should be judged when it is actually used in play for its quality. Though the Minority
Game is an extremely simplified market model, it allows to ask, analyze and answer many questions
which arise in real markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently it became possible to study markets of het-
erogenous agents, in particular in the form of the so-
called Minority Games (MG) [1,2]. Since long time prac-
titioners of the market, as well as some economists have
criticized the main-stream economics where a so-called
representative agent plays the central role. Many promi-
nent economists like Herbert Simon [3], Richard Day, and
Brian Arthur [4] have been forceful proponents of the
”bounded rationality” and ”inductive thinking”. How-
ever, though many people join in unison in their crit-
icism of the main-stream, their alternative approaches
and models do not command consensus yet.
The MG is inspired by Arthur’s ”El Farol” model [4],
which shows for the first time how the equilibrium can
be reached using inductive thinking. Whereas El Farol
model is about the equilibrium, our MG model is about
fluctuations. In a sense MG gives us a powerful tool to
study detailed pattern of fluctuations, the equilibrium
point is trivial by design. It is the fluctuations that play
the dominant role in economic activities, like the market
mechanism. MG allows us to study in a precise manner
how is the approach to equilibrium, how the agents try to
outsmart each other, for their selfish gain, compete for
the available marginal information (any deviation from
the mid-point represents exploitable advantage). It is
for this residual margin all the agents fight for, resem-
bling the real markets. The importance to market mech-
anism is primordial, as any practitioner can attest. Neo-
classical economics would tell us that the MG, as in a
competitive market, does not offer consistent gain, based
on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). However,
if some agents stop playing (i.e. choosing dynamically
among the two sides), they will give off information that
the other more deligent dynamic agents make away. In
the sense the equilibrium can be only dynamically main-
tained, any relaxing would imply a relative disadvantage.
Isn’t that the same thing in real markets?
Studying a model of market mechanism opens up many
detailed questions, which practitioners have to face con-
stantly but the main-stream economists do not have any
clue to answer them. For instance, in a model like MG
agents interact with each other through a common mar-
ket, what information each agent brings in? What gain
each agent takes out? How sophisticated should an agent
be? What is realizable gain objective? What is the role
of noise traders? How about insider trading (an agent
processing privileged information about fellow agents)?
What is the market impact of an otherwise clever strat-
egy? The list is obviously endless. The point we want to
make here is that with so little to start with, and with
so many questions relevant to real markets one can hope
for a qualitative answer.
After two years since the MG’s birth, during which
much work has revealed its extremely rich structure [5],
an analytical approach leading to its exact solution has
been found [6,7]. Unfortunately the main progress is still
confined in the physics community. We hope that, with
this paper, this will change: The aim is to convince peo-
ple, including economists hopefully, that many concrete
questions about market mechanisms can be asked and an-
swered, in precise and analytical way, using the approach
of refs. [6,7]. In fact the MG can be used as a flexible
platform and different handles can be added and manip-
ulated almost at wish. To achieve our goal, the anaytic
approach shall be supplemented by numerical simulations
to confirm its validity. More technical parts and heavy
calculations shall be dealt with in the appendices.
II. MAIN RESULTS
Here below we give a list of salient points of our paper:
1. Diversification of ideas. If an agent has different
alternative strategies, the latter may have better
to be diversified, i.e. not too much correlated. We
show the effects of diversification.
2. Markets have two types of agents: producers and
speculators. The former do not have alternative
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strategies; the latter are represented by the normal
agents of the standard MG. Producers provide in-
formation into the market, upon which speculators
feed. For the first time it is possible to demonstrate
that producers and speculators need each other,
they live in a symbiosis. However, benefits to each
group are not equal, depending on the parameters.
3. Agents are not obliged to play, if they do not see
a possible gain. We generalize MG to let agents
to have the option of not playing. In the presence
of producers, markets appear to be attractive and
more speculators are drawn into the fore.
4. Noise traders. One may wonder if some traders
decide to be pure noise traders, i.e. they use com-
pletely random strategy, what is the ”harm” done
to other market participants (producers and specu-
lators), as well as to themselves. In the information
rich, they appear to increase volatility and in the
herding-effect phase, they actually make the mar-
ket perform better.
5. Despite of the fact that agents start equally
equipped, there are better and worse agents and
the rank of the agents has an interesting non Gaus-
sian ”bar-code” structure.
6. Sometimes it pays to increase the capacity of
an agent’s brain, say add one more unit in M .
This will give enormous advantage to the better
equipped agent in the crowded phase (or symmet-
ric phase) where information on the range M is
exhausted, whereas such a feature becomes a dis-
advantage in the information rich phase.
7. Does it pay to have more strategies as alternatives?
In general yes. Here we calculate the relative ad-
vantage by having more alternatives. We also show
that, due to self-market impact, the imagined gain
differs from the real gain, a fact known too well to
market practitioners. Even each agent has many
alternatives, they actually use only a small number
of them.
8. Some agents may get illegal information about oth-
ers. Just like a stock broker who knows his clients’
orders before execution. Hence he has privileged
information and should be barred from trading.
One agent who spies on fellow agents enjoys trading
advantages. We measure how much is this effect,
as the number of fellow agents whom you spy in-
creases, how much would be your gain.
III. FORMALISM AND REVIEW
Our model of market consists of N agents which, for
simplicity, can take only one of two actions, such as “buy”
and “sell” at each time step t. We represent this assuming
that each agent i = 1, . . . , N , at time t, can either do the
action ai(t) = +1 or the opposite action ai(t) = −1.
Given the actions of all agents, the gain of agent i is
given by:
gi(t) = −ai(t)A(t), where A(t) =
N∑
j=1
aj(t). (1)
This equation models the basic structure of market in-
teraction where each agent’s payoffs are determined by
the action taken and by a global quantity A(t), which
is usually a price and it is determined by all of them.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume here a linear de-
pendence of gi(t) on A(t). Other choices, such as gi(t) =
−ai(t)signA(t) in refs. [1,8,9], can be taken without af-
fecting qualitatively the results we shall discuss below.
This interaction clearly rewards the minority of agents
(those who took the action ai(t) = −signA(t)) who gain
an amount |A(t)| and punishes the majority by a loss
−|A(t)|, hence the name minority game [1]. There are
always more losers than winners and agents have no way
of knowing what the majority will do before taking their
actions.
All agents have access to public information which is
represented by an integer variable µ taking one of P val-
ues. At time t information “takes the value” µ(t). We
shall also call µ(t) history since originally this informa-
tion has been introduced as encoding the record of the
past M = log2 P signs of A(t) with M bits. It has how-
ever been shown [10] that if µ(t) is randomly drawn in
{1, . . . , P} one recovers the same results (see also the dis-
cussion in refs. [6,7]). We shall henceforth consider this
second, simpler case. When having access to some infor-
mation, agents can behave differently for different values
of µ(t), eventually because of their personal beliefs on
the impact that information µ(t) shall have on the mar-
ket’s outcome A(t). Strictly speaking A(t) only depends
on what agents do, so µ(t) has no direct impact on the
market. However if agents behavior depends on µ(t) also
A(t) shall depend on it, and we denote it by Aµ(t)(t).
How do agents choose actions under information µ(t)?
If agents expect that µ(t) contains some information on
the market, they will consider forecasting strategies which
for each value of µ suggest which action aµ shall be done.
There are 2P such strategies, and we assume, for the time
being, that each agent just picks S such rules randomly
(with replacement) from the set of all 2P strategies. The
action of agent i if she follows her sth strategy and the
information is µ is denoted by aµs,i. Therefore, if si(t)
is the choice made (in a way we shall specify below) by
agent i at time t, her action becomes ai(t)→ aµ(t)si(t),i and
correspondingly, her gain [Eq. (1)] becomes
2
gi(t) = −aµ(t)si(t),iA
µ(t)(t), where Aµ(t)(t) =
N∑
j=1
a
µ(t)
sj(t),j
.
(2)
In this paper, we mainly focus on S = 2. This case
contains all the richness of the model and allows a more
transparent presentation. All the results discussed below
can be extended to S > 2 along the lines of ref. [7]. For
S = 2 we can adopt a notation where each agent controls
a variable si ∈ {↓, ↑}, with the indentification ↑= +1 and
↓= −1. This is useful to distinguish strategies si from
actions ai. It is convenient to introduce the variables
ωµi =
aµ↑,i + a
µ
↓,i
2
, ξµi =
aµ↑,i − aµ↓,i
2
(3)
With these notations, the action taken by this agent in
reaction to the history µ is:
aµi,si = ω
µ
i + ξ
µ
i si. (4)
so ωµi represents the part of i’s strategies which is fixed,
whereas ξµi is the variable part. We also define Ω
µ =∑
i ω
µ
i so that
Aµ(t) =
N∑
i=1
aµi,si(t) = Ω
µ +
N∑
i=1
ξµi si(t). (5)
Each agent updates the cumulated virtual payoffs of
all her strategies according to
Us,i(t+ 1) = Us,i(t)−Aµ(t)(t) aµ(t)i,s (6)
The quantity Ui,s is a “reliability index” which quantifies
the agent i’s perception of the success of her sth strategy.
Ui,s(t) is the virtual cumulated payoff that agent i would
have received up to time t if she had always played strat-
egy s (with others playing the strategies sj(t
′) which they
actually played at times t′ < t). Virtual here means that
this is not the real cumulated payoff but rather that per-
ceived by agent i. These differ, as explained below and in
ref. [7], because agents neglect their impact on the mar-
ket (i.e. the fact that if they had indeed always played s
the aggregate quantity A(t) would have been different).
Inductive dynamics [4,1] consists in assuming that
agents trust and use their most reliable strategy, which
are those with the largest virtual score:
si(t) = arg max
s∈{↑,↓}
Ui,s(t). (7)
More generally one can consider a probabilistic choice
rule – the so called Logit model [11] – such that P (si(t) =
s) ∝ exp[ΓUs,i(t)], (see [12,6,7]). Then Eq. (7) is recov-
ered in the limit Γ→∞. As in ref. [13], we find it useful
to introduce the variables ∆i(t) = Ui,↑ − Ui,↓. Their
dynamics reads
∆i(t+ 1) = ∆i(t)−Aµt(t)ξµti (8)
and Eq. (7) becomes
si(t) = sign∆i(t). (9)
A. Notations on averages
We define the temporal average of a given time depen-
dent quantity R(t) as
〈R〉 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
R(t). (10)
This quantity can be decomposed into conditional aver-
ages on histories, that is
〈Rµ〉 = lim
T→∞
P
T
T∑
t=1
R(t)δµ(t),µ. (11)
Note that the factor P and the relation 〈δµ(t),µ〉 = 1/P
imply that 〈Rµ〉 is a conditional average. More precisely
it is the temporal average of the quantity R(t) subject to
the condition that the actual history µ(t) was1 µ. Finally,
averages over the histories µ of a quantity Rµ are defined
as
R ≡ 1
P
P∑
µ=1
Rµ. (12)
B. Quantities of interest
With these notations, let us now discuss the main
quantities which characterize the stationary state of the
system. The main free parameter, as first observed in
ref. [8], is
α =
P
N
(13)
and we shall eventually consider the thermodynamic
limit where N,P → ∞ with α fixed. The first quantity
of interest is
σ2 ≡ 〈A2〉 = Ω2 + 2
N∑
i=1
Ωξi〈si〉〈si〉+
∑
i,j
ξiξj〈sisj〉.
(14)
1This implies that the number of iterations must be propor-
tional to P in any numerical simulation
3
This equals the total loss of agents
−
∑
i
〈gi〉 = σ2, (15)
so it is a measure of global waste. It also quantifies the
market’s “volatility” i.e. the fluctuations of the quan-
tity A(t), and is related to the average “distance” be-
tween agents (see appendix A). Even though 〈A〉 = 0,
by symmetry, it may happen that for a particular µ, the
aggregate quantity A(t) is nonzero on average, i.e. that
〈Aµ〉 6= 0. In order to quantify this asymmetry, we intro-
duce the quantity
H ≡ 〈A〉2 = Ω2 + 2
N∑
i=1
Ωξi〈si〉〈si〉+
∑
i,j
ξiξj〈si〉〈sj〉.
(16)
Note that the only difference with σ2 lies in the diagonal
terms (i = j) of the last sum. Indeed we assume that
〈sisj〉 = 〈si〉〈sj〉 for i 6= j, whereas2 〈s2i 〉 ≡ 1 6= 〈si〉2.
Indeed, we can write
σ2 = H +
N∑
i=1
ξ2i (1− 〈si〉2). (17)
If H > 0, the game is asymmetric: At least for some µ
one has that 〈Aµ〉 6= 0. This implies that there is a best
strategy aµbest = −sign 〈Aµ〉 which in principle could give
a positive gain |〈A〉| − 1 3. In economic terms we may
say that the system is not arbitrage free, and that H is a
measure of the perceived arbitrage opportunities present
in the market. As a function of α = P/N the system
displays a phase transition with symmetry breaking [13]:
For α > αc the symmetry between the two signs of A(t)
is broken.
H plays a particular important role because in refs.
[6,7] it has been shown that the inductive dynamics is
equivalent to a dynamics which minimizes H in the dy-
namical variables mi = 〈si〉. Therefore the ground state
properties of the Hamiltonian H yields the stationary
state of the system. H is a spin glass Hamiltonian where
Ωξi are the local magnetic fields and ξiξj the coupling be-
tween two agents. These play the same role as quenched
2This amounts to say that the fluctuations in time of si
around its average 〈si〉 are uncorrelated with sj − 〈sj〉.
This assumption fails when crowd effects occur, i.e. in the
symmetric phase, and our theory will accordingly fail to de-
scribe these effects.
3Here the −1 comes from the fact that if the strategy is
actually played Aµ → Aµ + aµbest and “in principle” means
that Aµ would also change as a result of the fact that other
agents would also react to the best strategy agent.
disorder in spin glasses. This system is of mean field
type since interactions ξiξj are infinite ranged. For this
reason, the statistical mechanics approach to disordered
systems [14,15] via the replica method yields exact re-
sults for these models (see appendix C). The behavior
of each agent is completely determined by the difference
of her cumulated payoffs ∆i. For long times, ∆i ≃ vit
where
vi = 〈∆(t+ 1)−∆i(t)〉 = −2〈A〉ξi. (18)
If vi 6= 0 agent i shall stick to only one strategy si =
sign vi, whereas if vi = 0 she will sometimes use her ↑
strategy and sometimes her ↓ one. This is quantified
by mi, and a global measure of the fluctuations in the
strategic choices of agents is given by
Q =
1
N
N∑
i=1
m2i . (19)
This quantity also emerges naturally from the replica ap-
proach where it plays a key role.
IV. SPECULATORS WITH DIVERSIFIED
STRATEGIES
In the standard MG, it is assumed that the agents
draw all their strategies randomly, and independently.
One can argue that the agents can be less simple-minded
so that they first draw a strategy, and then following
their needs or what seems the best for them, draw the
others strategies. For instance, if S = 2, an agent can
believe that one strategy is enough and sticks to it (or
takes two same strategies). Reversely, an agent might
believe that it is better to have one strategy and the
opposite one. More generally, we suppose that all the
agents4 draw their second strategy according to
P (aµ↑ = a
µ
↓ ) = c ∀µ. (20)
The parameter c counts the average fraction of his-
tories for which the agents’ choices are biased, that
is, the average correlation between their two strategies.
The standard MG corresponds to the independent case
c = 1/2, while having only one strategy is obtained with
c = 1. The other very special case is c = 0 : all agents
have two opposite strategies, thus there is no asymme-
try in the outcome. As a result, the game is always in
the symmetric phase : as α is varied, no phase transi-
tion occurs. Increasing c has two effects : on one hand
it increases the bias of the outcome Ωµ ∼
√
cN , on the
4This can be generalized to a c for each agent ; exact results
also arise from the replica calculus
4
other hand it reduces the ability of the agents of being
adaptative, since they learn something about the game
only when ξµi 6= 0 (see Eq (8)), which happens in average
for (1−c)P histories. The fact that the biases depend on
c too implies that the second order phase transition also
occurs when this parameter is varied. With the replica
formalism (see appendix C), one gets the phase diagram
of the MG with parameter c (see figure 1). In the stan-
dard MG, one varies α (dot-dashed vertical line). If one
fixes α and changes c, the symmetry is also broken (any
horizontal line). Note that if c = 0 and α > 1, an in-
finitesimal c breaks the symmetry of the game.
1
c
0
0.5
1
α
α
c
 (th.)
α
c
 (exp.)
Asymmetric  phase
Symmetric  phase
FIG. 1. Phase diagram of the Minority Game with diver-
sified strategies. The phase transition in the standard MG
corresponds to the dash-dotted vertical line c = 1/2. The
circle are numerical data
V. SPECULATORS AND PRODUCERS
Real markets are not zero sum games [16]. The fact
that most participants are interested in playing is beyond
doubt. In real markets the participants can be grossly di-
vided into two groups: Speculators and Producers [16].
Producers can be characterized by those using the market
for purposes other than speculation. They need market
for hedging, financing, or any ordinary business. They
thus pay less or no attention to ”timing the market”.
Speculators, on the other hand, join the market with the
aim of exploiting the marginal profit pockets. The two
groups were shown to live in symbiosis [16]: the former
inject information into the market prices, and the lat-
ter make a living carefully exploiting this information.
One may wonder why do producers let themselves be
taken advantage of. Our answer is that they have other,
probably more profitable business in mind. To conduct
their business, they need the market, and their expertises
and talents in other areas give them still better games to
play. Speculators, being less capable in other areas, or
by choice, make do exploiting the ”meager margin” left
in the competitive market.
In our MG, these general questions can be studied in
detail. Producers will be limited in choice, their activ-
ities outside the game are not represented. We define
a speculator as an normal agent, and a producer as
an agent limited to one strategy. Thus the latter have
a fixed pattern in their market behavior and put a mea-
surable amount of information into the market, which
is exploited by the speculators. We take a population
of N speculators and always define α = P/N . We add
ρN heterogeneous producers, so that ρ is the fraction of
producers per speculator. The outcome is then
Aµ = Aµspec +A
µ
prod. (21)
The bias induced by the producers adds to the one
caused by the speculators, so that the total bias is of
order
√
(c+ ρ/2)N . Therefore the phase transition can
be obtained at fixed P by varying either N , c, or the
number of producers. Let us begin with the last possi-
bility. We fix c = 0, P = 28, N = 641 and plot the
gains of the speculators and producers as a function of
the number of producers (see figure 2). In the symmetric
phase, the speculators wash out all the available infor-
mation, thus, by symmetry, the gain of the producers
(squares) is zero. As the number of producers increases,
the gain of the speculators (circles) stays negative but
grows monotonically, while the gain of the producers re-
mains zero as long as the symmetry of the outcome is not
broken. When the number of producers reaches a critical
value, the speculators are no more able to remove all the
available information, therefore the (second order) phase
transition occurs (dashed line). Beyond this point, the
producers lose more and more, while some (frozen) spec-
ulators gain more than zero in average (see VIII). At
one point, the gains of speculators and producers are the
same. Finally, there are enough producers to make the
gain of the speculators positive on average.
0 2 4 6 8 10
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−1
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FIG. 2. Gain of producers and speculators versus the num-
ber of producers (in P unit); the number of speculators is
fixed at N = 641 (c = 0, M = 8, S = 2, α = 0.4, average over
200 realizations). The lines are theoretical predictions.
As illustrated by figures 3 and 4, if the number of spec-
ulators changes the behavior is qualitatively the inverse
of the one of figure 2: The gain of producers increases as
the number of producers grows; similarly, the gain of the
speculators decreases when N increases for sufficiently
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large N . If there are not enough producers, the game is
always negative sum for the speculators, and their gain
has a maximum (see figure 3).
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FIG. 3. Gain of producers and speculators versus the num-
ber of speculators (in P unit); the number of producers is fixed
at 64 (c = 0, M = 8, S = 2, average over 200 realizations).
The lines lines are theoretical predictions.
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FIG. 4. Gain of producers and speculators versus the num-
ber of speculators (in P unit); the number of producers is fixed
at 256 (c = 0, M = 6, S = 2, average over 200 realizations).
The lines are theoretical predictions.
We now expose exact analytical results concerning the
gain of the two types of agents. They rely on the gen-
eralization of the approach of refs. [6,7]: the calculus is
carried out in detail in appendix C. Let us introduce
Gspec, the total gain of the speculators and Gprod, the
one of the producers. From Eq (15)
Gspec +Gprod = −σ2. (22)
The results depend on the ratio ρ between the number
of producers, on the number of speculators and on c, the
parameter introduced in the previous section. We obtain
σ2
N
=
c+ ρ+ (1− c)Q
(1 + χ)2
+ (1 − c)(1−Q) (23)
where χ is the magnetic susceptibility of the system, and
Q is defined in section III B. These two quantities depend
on α and on (1+ρ)/(1−c) (see appendix C). The average
gain per producer is
Gprod
ρN
= − 1
1 + χ
(24)
and the average gain per speculator is
Gspec
N
= −c+ ρ+ (1− c)Q
(1 + χ)2
− (1 − c)(1−Q) + ρ
1 + χ
.
(25)
Figures 2, 3 and 4 completely agree with analytical re-
sults; note that the small deviations are finite size effects.
The fact that the gains of producers and speculators only
depend on the ration ρ and not on how many producers
and speculators there are in the game explains why fig-
ures 3 and 4 look very much like the inverse of figure
2.
As it emerges for the replica calculus, the critical point
αc only depends
5 on (1 + ρ)/(1 − c) (see figure 5), that
is, on the distribution of the quenched disorder. Numer-
ical data (circles) completely agree with our results. The
vertical line corresponds to the standard MG (ρ = 0 and
c = 1/2). A more intuitive version of this phase diagram
is shown in figure 6 for c = 0.
1 2 3 4 5
(1+ρ)/(1−c)
0
0.5
1
α
α
c
 (th.)
α
c
 (exp.)
Asymmetric phase
Symmetric phase
FIG. 5. Phase diagram αc[(1 + ρ)/(1− c)]
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Symmetric phase
Gspec > 0Gspec < 0
FIG. 6. Phase diagram, and zero sum gain for speculators
with c = 0
5This explain why evolutionary schemes that preserve the
distribution of the quenched disorder have the same αc [17],
while others that involve Darwinism, shift αc [1,9].
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The game becomes favorable, on average, for the spec-
ulators when their average gain is greater than zero. Us-
ing Eq (25), one can plot the curve of zero sum gain for
the speculators (see figure 6). One can see that the num-
ber of producers must be greater than 1.868 . . . P (this
value depends on c) in order to make the game positive
sum for the speculators; this is consistent with numerical
simulations (figures 3 and 4).
The main message of these results is that producers
always benefit from the presence of speculators, and re-
versely : both types of agents live in symbiosis. Indeed,
the producers introduce systematic biases into the mar-
ket, and without speculators, their losses would be pro-
portional to theses biases. The speculators precisely try
to remove this kind of bias, reducing also systematic fluc-
tuations in the market, thus reducing the losses of the
producers and their own losses. Moreover, the efforts of
speculators yield a positive gain only if the number of
producers is sufficiently large. In this respect the sym-
metric phase, where producers do not loose and specu-
lators loose a lot, is unrealistic: real speculators would
rather withdraw from a market which is in this phase,
thus increasing α, and recovering the asymmetric phase.
This suggests that a grand-canonical MG is much more
realistic 6. Here we briefly present an over-simplified
“grand-canonical” MG. An agent enters into the market
only when she has a strategy with virtual points greater
than zero. As a result, the game is always in the asym-
metric phase, but almost at the transition point : the av-
erage losses of the producers are always extremely small
(see figure 7). When the number of producers increases,
the a priori asymmetry of the outcome increases, and
more and more agents actually play the game (see figure
8), thus in this situation, the producers give incentives to
play to the speculators. Accordingly, the average gains
of the speculators is much higher in this grand-canonical
MG than in the corresponding canonical MG.
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6See also [18,19]
FIG. 7. Average gain per agent versus the number of pro-
ducers (in P units) in the grand canonical MG (N = 107,
M = 5, α = 0.3, S = 2, c = 1/2, average over 500 realiza-
tions)
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FIG. 8. Average number of speculators versus the num-
ber of producers (in P units) in the grand canonical MG
(N = 107, M = 5, α = 0.3, S = 2, c = 1/2, average over
500 realizations, )
VI. SPECULATORS, PRODUCERS AND NOISE
TRADERS
The debate about what the noise traders do to a com-
petitive market is not closed [20]. In the economics
literature a noise trader is not very precisely defined.
Sometimes they are synonym with speculators. We de-
fine noise traders in the following way: they choose
their actions without any basis. Compared with specula-
tors, who analyze carefully the market information, noise
traders take action in a purely random way (see appendix
C). Noise traders may be speculators who base their ac-
tion on astrology, on “fengshui”, or on some “random
number generators”. Our present model allows us to eval-
uate the influence of noise traders on the market. They
increase the market volatility σ2, as shown in Fig. 9 and
in appendix C. Therefore, in principle, they do harm to
themselves as well to other participants. Actually in the
linear–payoff version that we consider, the average gain of
speculators and producers is not much affected by noise
traders, since 〈Anoise〉 = 0. However, it is easy to see that
in the original version, where gi(t) = −ai(t)signA(t),
payoffs are reduced by the presence of noise traders (see
appendix D).
Our numerical results of Fig. 9 also shows that deep in
the symmetric phase, noise traders reduces the volatility
per agent σ2/(N+Nnoise), when this becomes bigger than
one. This is easy to understand assuming that the only
effect of noise traders is to increase σ2 by a constant equal
to Nnoise ≡ ηN . Let σ20/N be the volatility per agent,
without noise traders (η = 0) and σ2η that with noise
traders. The variation in the volatility per agent in the
presence of noise traders is:
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σ2η
N(1 + η)
− σ
2
0
N
≃ σ
2
0 + ηN
N(1 + η)
− σ
2
0
N
=
1− σ20/N
1 + 1/η
. (26)
As illustrated by figure 9, numerical simulations globally
confirm these conclusions, but also show that the effects
of the noise traders are more pronounced than the theory
predicts.
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FIG. 9. Normalized variance of the outcome with (opaque
circles and without (black squares) noise traders; the dotted
line is the naive theoretical prediction. Inset : difference of
variances with and without noise traders (N = 101 specula-
tors, 50 noise traders, average over 1000 realizations).
VII. MARKET IMPACT
In order to quantify the impact of an agent on the
market let us first consider the case of an external agent
with S strategies: This agent does not take part in the
game but just observes it from the outside. From this
position, each of her strategies gives an average7 virtual
gain
us = −as〈A〉, s = 1, . . . , S. (27)
Given that the strategies aµs are drawn randomly, us are
independent random variables. Since us is the sum of
P ≫ 1 independent variables aµs 〈Aµ〉/P , their distribu-
tion is Gaussian with zero mean and variance
Var(us) =
1
P 2
P∑
µ=1
Var(aµs )〈Aµ〉2 =
H
P
.
Clearly, one of these strategies, that with us∗ = maxs us,
is superior to all others8. It would be most reasonable
for this agent to just stick to this strategy.
However, the same agent inside the game will typically
use not only strategy s∗. This is because every strategy,
7The average is meant over a long time here
8The distribution of us∗ can be easily computed using ex-
treme statistics. For S ≫ 1 typically us∗ ≃
√
2H log(S)/P .
when used, delivers a real gain which is reduced with re-
spect to the virtual one by the “market impact”. Imag-
ine the “experiment” of injecting the new agent in a MG.
Then 〈Aµ〉 → 〈Aµ〉+aµs , where, in a first approximation,
we neglect the reaction of other agents to the new-comer.
Then the real gain of the newcomer is:
gs ∼= −as〈A〉 − 〈as as〉 = us − 1. (28)
The agent will then update the scores Us(t) with the
real gain gs for the strategy she uses and with the virtual
one us′ = gs′ + 1 − asas′ , for the strategies she does not
use (in the following, we neglect the term asas′). There-
fore inductive agents over-estimate the performance of
the strategies they do not play. Then if strategy s is
played with a frequency ps, the virtual score increases on
average by
δUs = Us(t+ 1)− Us(t) = psgs + (1− ps)(gs + 1)
= gs − ps + 1 (29)
at each time step (on average). If the agent ends up play-
ing only n out of her S strategies with some frequency
ps > 0, it must be that the virtual score increases δUs
are all equal for these strategies and the virtual scores
of strategies not played is lower. More precisely let
s = 1, . . . , n label the strategies which are played and
r = n+ 1, . . . , S those which are not played. It must be
that
δUs = gs − ps + 1 = v s = 1, . . . , n (30)
δUr = gr + 1 < v r = n+ 1, . . . , S. (31)
These equations yield the number n of strategy that this
agent will use. Normalization of ps in the first equation
yields the average virtual gain v of the agent, which is
v =
1
n
n∑
s=1
gs − 1
n
+ 1. (32)
Using ps = gs + 1 − v, we can compute the real gain of
the inductive agent g =
∑n
s=1 psgs.
Summarizing, we find that inductive agents mix their
best strategy with less performing ones. This is a conse-
quence of the fact that they neglect their impact on the
market.
So far we did not take into account the reaction of other
agents to the new-comer. In order to quantify this effect,
let us consider a MG in the asymmetric phase, and let us
add a new agent with the best strategy aµ = −sign 〈Aµ〉.
This gives us an idea of this effect in the extreme case
and we expect that for a randomly drawn strategy the
effect will be smaller. Neglecting the reaction of other
agents, we find that the available information with the
new-comer should be H ′ ≃ H − 2|〈A〉| + 1. Figure 10
shows that the reaction of all agents is indeed negligible,
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excepted near the critical point, where H is of the order
of 1.
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FIG. 10. Ratio of real H ′ over approximated
H ′ ≃ H − 2|〈A〉| + 1 versus α (N = 101, average over 100
realizations)
VIII. GAIN
In this section we show how the behavior and the gain
of each agent (speculator as well as producer) depends
on her microscopic constitution and on the asymmetry
of the outcome A(t) in the asymmetric phase. Let us
denote the gain of agent i by gi ; by definition,
gi = −〈Aai〉. (33)
In the asymmetric phase, since the stationary state is
mean field, 〈sisj〉 = mimj . Consequently, by expanding
Eq. (33) one obtains
gi = −〈A〉ωi − 〈Asi〉ξi
= −〈A〉ωi − 〈A〉ξimi − ξ2i (1−m2i ). (34)
Remember that the stationary behavior of agent i is
described by vi = −2〈A〉ξi (see section III). If an agent is
non frozen, vi = 0, while mi = −signvi otherwise, hence
the gain of a generic agent i is
gi = −〈A〉ωi + |〈A〉ξi| − ξ2i (1−m2i ). (35)
Note that the second term of above equation vanishes for
a non frozen agent j and therefore
gj = −〈A〉ωj − ξ2j (1−m2j) non frozen. (36)
On the other hand, the third term of Eq. (35) vanishes
if agent k is frozen:
gk = −〈A〉ωk + |〈A〉ξk| frozen. (37)
In Eqs (36) and (37), the gain of each agent is expressed
as her internal constitution, allowing us to interpret what
does the gain of a general agent depends on. In both
equations, the first term −〈A〉ωi, which represent how
much the agents loose due to their bias, is on average
negative, due to the impact this bias has on the market.
The second term in Eq (36) is always negative, and repre-
sents the losses due to the switching between strategies,
which, as shown above, arises from the neglect of market
impact. Since the probability distribution function of mi
is not Gaussian [6], this term gives rise to an non Gaus-
sian distribution of gj for non frozen agents. The average
gain of the r-th best agent is represented in figure 12.
By contrast, the term ξ2k(1−m2k) disappears for a frozen
agent because m2k = 1. It is replaced by |〈A〉ξk| which
is always positive and which measures how well agent k
exploits the available information. Therefore, in average,
the frozen agents gain more than the non frozen ones.
This is clearly illustrated in figure 11 which also shows
that Eqs. (36) and (37) are exact. Finally, a producer
is of course frozen, and her gain is always zero, since she
has |〈A〉ξk| = 0.
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FIG. 11. Theoretical gain versus experimental gain show-
ing that the frozen agents gain more than the active ones
(α = 0.5, M = 6)
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FIG. 12. Bar-code structure of the r-th best agent’s gain
(α = 10, M = 10, S = 2, average over 300 realizations)
IX. PRIVILEGED AGENT OR
INSIDER-TRADING
In this section we consider a MG where a particular
agent has different characteristics. In particular we ad-
dress the question of what additional resources would
be advantageous for this agent and in which circum-
stances. In the first subsection, we consider an agent
with S′ strategies (with S′ > S, where S is the number
of strategies assigned to other agents). The last two sub-
sections are devoted to the study of effects of asymmetric
9
information, in which an agent has access to privileged
information which the other cannot access. This can be
achieved in several ways. First, we consider the case of
a pure population with memory M and one agent with
a longer memory M ′. Then we consider the case of an
agent who knows, in advance, how a subset of agents
plays.
A. An agent with S′ strategies
In the symmetric phase, no matter how many strate-
gies an agent has, there is no possibility of gaining.
Therefore we focus in this section on the asymmetric
phase.
As shown in Sect. VII, inductive agents over-estimate
the performance of the strategies they do not play
Let us consider now the case where an agent with S′
strategies enters into a MG. As shown in Sect. VII, to
a good approximation, the value of H/P is the only rel-
evant information we need to retain of the stationary
state of the MG without the special agent. This quan-
tity encodes all other informations such as the number of
producers, the number of strategies played by the agents
in the MG and the value of α.
We carried out numerical simulations, and compared
it to the analytical results derived in Sect. VII. These
are shown in the figures 13, for H/P = 0.5, and 14,
for H/P = 1. The virtual gain v is always larger than
the actual gain g. Even though g is less than the gain
agents would get playing only their best strategy E[gs∗ ]
(maximal gain), it is not much smaller and has the same
leading behavior g ∝
√
lnS.
Numerical simulations agree well with analytical re-
sults, apart from finite size effects which become more
pronounced if H/P is small9.
Figures 13 and 14 refer to values of H/P which are
realistic of MG with producers. A moderately large S′
suffices to obtain a positive gain g > 0. With S = 2 and
without producers H/P ∼ 0.1 at most. For these values
the analytic approach suggests that, even playing only
her best strategy an agent would need S′ > 750 strate-
gies to have a positive gain, whereas inductive agents
would need more than S′ ≃ 2400 strategies to obtain a
positive gain. The same agent would find that her virtual
gain becomes positive with only S′ > 8 strategies. These
results for H/P = 0.1 suffer from strong finite size effects
(which indeed are of the order of P/H). One would need
system sizes N which are well beyond what our compu-
tational resources allow to confirm these conclusions.
9This is mostly due the term which we have neglected in the
section VII : it is typically of the order of P/H
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FIG. 13. Upper graph : average number of played strate-
gies (circles) versus S′. Below : average virtual (diamonds)
and actual (squares) gains versus S′ for H/P = 0.5, from
top to below (averages over 500 realizations). The lines are
theoretical predictions
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FIG. 14. Upper graph : average number of played strate-
gies (circles) versus S′. Below : average virtual (diamonds)
and actual (squares) gains versus S′ for H/P = 1, from top
to below (averages over 500 realizations). The lines are theo-
retical predictions.
It is also interesting to observe that the number of
strategies actually used by the inductive agent increases
with S (sub-linearly) and it decreases as H/P increases
(see figures 13 and 14). That means that if there is more
exploitable information in the system, agent’s behavior
becomes more peaked on the best strategy.
B. M ′ > M
Let us consider the case of a pure population with
memory M and one agent with a longer memory10 M ′.
Figure 15 plots the gain of such an agent withM ′ =M+1
as a function of α. The average gain of all agents is also
shown for comparison. In the asymmetric phase the spe-
10In this kind of numerical simulations, one has to keep the
dynamics of histories
10
cial agent receives a lower payoff, which can be under-
stood by observing that she has a number of histories
P ′ = 2M
′
= 2P bigger than that of the pure population.
Thus her effective α′ = 2α is larger, which is detrimental
in the asymmetric phase.
The gain of the special agent is the same as that of
normal agents at the point where there is neither persis-
tence, nor anti-persistence (α ≃ 0.25 for M = 3, and αc
in the thermodynamic limit).
By contrast, in the symmetric phase, the game is
symmetric for normal agents but their anti-persistent
behavior produces arbitrages who can be exploited by
agents having a bigger memory. Indeed, as α decreases,
the available information HM ′ for the privileged agent
grows11. As a result the gain of the privileged agent be-
comes larger than that of other agents and as α becomes
small enough, it becomes positive.
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FIG. 15. Upper graph : normalized available information
for M andM+1. Lower graph : Gain of an agent withM+1
within a pure population with M = 3 (S = 2, average over
3000 realizations)
Can the anti-persistence be exploited even more if one
increases M ′ ? The figure 16 answers clearly no. This
is not surprising since again the effective α is bigger and
bigger asM ′ is increased. At the same time, the available
information increases, but too slowly.
11HM′ is defined as H = 〈A〉2, but with an average over
µ′ = 1, . . . , 2P .
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FIG. 16. Gain of an agent with M ′ = M + ∆M within
a pure population with M = 3 (α = 0.1, average over 1000
realizations
C. Espionage
Some agents may have access to some information
about other agents. This is the case of a stock broker
who knows his clients’ orders before execution, hence he
has privileged information and should be barred from
trading. When there is no available information, as in the
symmetric phase, an agent who has access to asymmetric
information can expect at least to lose much less than the
others agents, or even to have a positive gain. Also, since
having access to a little information is greatly preferable
to no information at all, only a very limited amount of
information is needed to get a considerable advantage.
Suppose that agent b knows the sign sB of the aggregate
actions of a subset B of other agents. Let B = |B| be the
number of agents in B. Then sB(t) = sign
∑
i∈B ai(t).
She can exploit this supplementary information by hav-
ing two virtual values U+b,s(t) and U
−
b,s(t) for each of
her strategies. In other words, if agent b knows that
sB(t) = +1 before having to choose, she takes her deci-
sion according to the scores U+b,s(t), that is,
sb(t) = arg max
s=1,···,S
U+b,s(t); (38)
she updates the scores of her strategies according to
U+b,s(t+ 1) = U
+
b,s(t)− aµ(t)b,s Aµ(t) (39)
and analogously if sB(t) = −1.
What is the kind of the supplementary information this
agent has access to ?
Since the outcome is anti-persistent in the symmetric
phase and persistent in the asymmetric phase, only at the
critical point there is no long term correlation in the out-
come [13]. Accordingly, the spy always gain more than
the average, except at the critical point where she gains
the same (see figure 17). With this setting, the agent has
access in particular to the anti-persistence of the sym-
metric phase, explaining why even if only one agent is
spied, the gain of the broker is much bigger (figure 18).
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Finally, the comparison between the two types of asym-
metric information we have considered shows that it is
much more interesting to spy than to have a larger mem-
ory : in the former case, one is sure to win more that the
normal agents, except at the critical point.
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FIG. 17. Gain of a spy and average gain of all agents ver-
sus α (N=101, NB = 3, 100P iterations, average over 100
realizations)
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FIG. 18. Gain of a spy versus the number of spied agents
(N = 1001, α = 0.15, average over 1000 realizations)
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have shown how to ask questions about
real market mechanisms in a tay model. In spite of the
severe simplification of the MG, with little modification
one is able to study a broad spectrum of problems which
could be dreamed of previously. The central result is
to show that agents with limited rationality (or limited
information processing power) can only make a market
marginally efficient. To the first approximation one can
say that these inductive players can maintain an approx-
imate equilibrium, which is the central result of the El-
Farol model. But studying carefully the fluctuations one
finds that the fact that the market is more or less efficient
does not imply that one can stop playing and sit at a ran-
domly chosen site. Doing so would make the model less
efficient. It is around this residual (marginal) inefficiency
that the players are busy about.
With the introduction of producers the game can be of
positive sum. We have shown how producers and specu-
lators live in a symbiosis: producers are passive players
who do not try to switch strategies. The reason is that
they volontierly give up the speculation opportunities be-
cause they have outside business in mind. Thus produc-
ers inject information that the eager speculators are just
happy to feed on. The speculators, while making away
profits, perform a social function by providing liquidity
thus reducing producers’ market impact. We believe this
is also true in real markets. Numerous other results show
that it is now possible to systematically study markets
with heterogeneous agents, whith real questions in mind.
APPENDIX A: GEOMETRIC AND ALGEBRAIC
APPROACHES TO THE MG
This appendix is devoted to giving intuitive but rigor-
ous views of what happens in the MG.
1. Geometric approach to the MG
The global behavior of the MG, measured by σ2, can
be quite well understood with a geometrical approach.
Indeed, it is directly related to a much more intuitive
geometrical concept : the Hamming distance between
agents [9], which is defined as follows for agents i and j:
di,j =
(ai − aj)2
4
=
1
2
− 1
2
aiaj . (A1)
It is worthwhile to note that 1− di,j equals the probabil-
ity that both agents take the same action for a randomly
drawn history, so for an agent, maximizing her distance
with respect to all other agents is equivalent to maxi-
mizing her gain. Since the game is dynamical, one has
to consider the time average of the actual Hamming dis-
tance between those two agents
〈di,j〉 = 1
2
− 1
2
〈aiaj〉. (A2)
The average Hamming distance per agent is then
〈d〉 = 1
N(N − 1)
∑
i,j
〈di,j〉 = 1
2
− 1
2N(N − 1)
∑
i,j
〈aiaj〉
(A3)
The relationship between the distance and the fluctua-
tions arises naturally by rewriting the latter as
σ2 = N +
∑
i6=j
〈aiaj〉, (A4)
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that is, as a sum over random fluctuations and correla-
tions. Putting Eqs (A3) and (A4) together, one finds
σ2
N
= 1− 2(N − 1)
(
1
2
− 〈d〉
)
. (A5)
This equation12 links the geometrical [9,21] and the
analytical approaches [6,13]. It states that finding the
average Hamming distance between the agents is equiv-
alent to determining σ2 by the analytical tools used in
[6,7,13]. In general, it is impossible to find the average
distance with a geometrical approach due to the fact that
the Hamming distance is not transitive13. However, in
the so-called reduced space of strategies (RSS) [9], the
distance is transitive, consequently Johnson et al. could
find an approximate analytical expression of 〈d〉, and, by
implicitly using Eq. (A5) (which is straightforward in the
RSS), they also gave an approximative expression of σ2
[21]. An equation quite similar to Eq. (A5) also appears
in [22], where it is shown that perceptrons playing the
MG can cooperate.
2. Algebraic approach to the phase transition
We expose the algebraic origin of the phase transition.
As it has been recalled, the agents actually try to mini-
mize the available information H [6,7], and can actually
cancel it when α < αc. Let us see why. Since H is a
sum of P non negative averages 〈A〉2, H = 0 only if all
averages are zero, namely 〈A〉 = 0 ∀µ, or equivalently
N∑
i=1
ξµi 〈si〉 = −Ωµ ∀µ (A6)
These are P linear equations in N variables. However
the N variables m=〈si〉 are restricted to the [−1, 1] in-
terval. Above αc there are Nφ variables which are frozen
at the boundary of this interval (mi = ±1). Therefore
there are (1− φ)N free variables only. As shown in refs.
[6,7], the point αc marks the transition below which the
system of equations (A6) becomes degenerate, i.e. when
there are more variables than equations. Exactly at αc
the number of free variables (1 − φ)N exactly matches
the number of equations P . Dividing this equation by N
gives an equation for αc,
αc = 1− φ (A7)
which is indeed confirmed nuerically to a high accuracy.
12It is exact for any S; even more, it remains exact if agents
have not the same number of strategies.
13The knowledge of di,j and di,k does not allow that of dj,k.
When α < αc, there are much more free variables (N
indeed) than equations: the solutions of Eqs. (A6) then
belong to a subspace of dimension N − P . This allows
the anti-persistent behavior to take place, because the
system is free to move on this subspace. In the special
case c = 0, since there is no bias Ωµ = 0. The linear
system of equation is then homogeneous and the solution
〈si〉 = 0 for all i always exists. In particular, if α > 1,
this solution is unique, hence σ2/N = 1. When α < 1,
a subspace of solutions of dimension N − P arises, and
the anti-persistent behavior also takes place. Note that
in this case, the system is always in the symmetric phase,
therefore there is no phase transition.
This argument easily generalizes to S > 2 strategies [7].
If agents use, on average, n(S) strategies (and S − n(S)
are never used) the number of free variables is Nn(S).
There are P plus N equations which these have to sat-
isfy, where the latter N comes from the normalisation
condition on the frequency with which each strategy is
used. At the critical point, these two numbers are equal,
and we find
nc(S) = αc(S) + 1. (A8)
At the critical point nearly one half of the strategies yield
positive virtual gain and are used, whereas the others are
not used [7]. From this we find
αc(S) = αc(2) +
S
2
− 1 (A9)
This shows that actually αc grows linearly with S, but
in a slightly less simple way that the one previously be-
lieved [2,9,13,21].
Let us now show how the behavior of the agents is
related to persistence/anti-persistence. We define W as
the average over the agents of v2i :
W =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(vi)
2
(A10)
= lim
T→∞
1
T 2
T∑
t,t′=1
N∑
i=1
ξ
µ(t)
i ξ
µ(t′)
i A(t)A(t
′) (A11)
since the ξµi are independently drawn,
1
N
N∑
i=1
ξµi ξ
µ = (1− c)δµ,µ +O(1/
√
N). (A12)
Thus for large N
W ≃ lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
τ=1
〈A(t)A(t − τ)|µ(t) = µ(t− τ)〉 (A13)
where 〈A(t)A(t − τ)|µ(t) = µ(t′)〉means that the average
is taken over time for all t and τ such that µt = µt−τ ,
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and summed over all histories. A closely realated quan-
tity was first studied in ref. [13] where it was shown to
quantify anti-persistence in the symmetric phase.
Note that this equation implies that there can be no
frozen agents unless the outcome exhibits persistence (i.e.
〈A(t)A(t − τ)|µ(t) = µ(t− τ)〉 6= 0), which agrees with
the analysis of [13]. In this case we find
W ≃ H
N
(A14)
On the other hand, no agent can freeze unless H is
non zero, which is the same as saying that the outcome is
persistent. Furthermore, the condition of freezing vi 6= 0
is equivalent to [13]
ξiξi <
∣∣∣h˜i∣∣∣ , (A15)
where h˜i = Ωξi+
∑
j 6=i ξiξj〈sj〉. It is worthwhile to see
that ξiξi is the internal hamming distance. Eqs (A13)
and (A14) give global conditions whether there can be
frozen players or not, while Eq. (A15) give conditions on
individual freezing.
APPENDIX B: THE MG IN BIOLOGY
The MG model has another important application in
biology: the sex ratio of 50:50. In the widely read book of
Richard Dawkins ”Selfish Gene” [23], the Fischer theory
was brilliantly explained: if in the offspring pool either
males or females were in minority, reproductive strate-
gies for giving birth to a member in that minority would
enjoy a genetic advantage linearly proportional to the de-
viation from the 50:50 ratio. The stable ratio is thus dy-
namically maintained. Brian Arthur’s ”El Farol” model,
is also of the same genre, to show that using alternative
strategies can lead to equilibrium. MG goes one step fur-
ther: while the equilibrium point is previously solved in
different contexts by Fisher, Arthur et al, we concentrate
on more refined questions.
APPENDIX C: REPLICA METHOD FOR THE
MG
For the sake of generality, we consider three different
population of agents:
1. the first population is composed of N speculators.
These are adaptive agents and they have each two
speculative strategies aµ↑,i, a
µ
↓,i for i = 1, . . . , N and
µ = 1, . . . , P . These are drawn at random from the
pool of all strategies, independently for each agent.
We allow a correlation among the two strategies of
the same agent:
P (a↑, a↓) =
c
2
[
δa↑,+1δa↓,+1 + δa↑,−1δa↓,−1
]
+
1− c
2
[
δa↑,−1δa↓,+1 + δa↑,−1δa↓,+1
]
(C1)
Note that, for c = 0 agents choose just one strategy
a↑ and fix a↓ = −a↑ as its opposite, whereas for
c = 1 they have one and the same strategy a↑ = a↓.
The original random case [1,8] corresponds to c =
1/2. These agents assign scores Us,i(t) to each of
their strategies and play the strategy si(t) with the
highest score, as discussed in the text. Therefore
for speculators:
aspec(t) = a
µ(t)
si(t),i
. (C2)
2. then we consider N indepprod = ρN producers: They
have only one randomly and independently drawn
strategy bµi so
aprod(t) = b
µ(t)
i . (C3)
Producers have a predictable behavior in the mar-
ket and they are not adaptive. Instead of ρN in-
dependent producers one can also consider Ndepprod
correlated producers who all have the same pre-
dictable behavior bµprod.
3. Finally we consider ηN noise traders. These are
defined as agents whose actions are given by
anoise(t) = randomsign. (C4)
Each noise trader as a random number generator
which is independent of each other agent.
It has been shown [6,7] that the stationary state prop-
erties of the MG are described by the ground state of H .
Note that this approach fails however to reproduce the
anti-persistent behavior which is at the origin of crowd
effects in the symmetric phase. In our case
A(t) = Aspec(t) +Aprod(t) +Anoise(t) (C5)
where
Aspec(t) =
N∑
j=1
a
µ(t)
sj(t),j
(C6)
and
Aprod(t) =
ρN∑
j=1
b
µ(t)
j ≡ Aµ(t)prod (C7)
and Anoise(t) = 2k(t)− ηN where k(t) is a binomial ran-
dom variable with P (k) =
(
ηN
k
)
2−ηN . Since H = 〈A〉2
and the contribution of noise traders to 〈Aµ〉 vanishes
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〈Anoise〉 = 0, the collective behavior of the system is in-
dependent of η. Noise traders shall contribute a constant
ηN to σ2 and will not affect other agents. This only holds
in the asymmetric phase (see text). We can then reduce
to the study of speculators and producers only.
Let us define, for convenience, Aµ = Aµspec + λA
µ
prod
where
Aµspec =
N∑
i=1
[
aµ↑,i
1 + si
2
+ aµ↓,i
1− si
2
]
(C8)
and Aµprod is given in Eq. (C7). Here si is the dynamical
variable controlled by speculator i. We shall implicitly
consider directly time averaged quantities so si is a real
variable in [−1, 1] rather than a discrete one. The pa-
rameter λ is inserted so that, once we have computed
the energy H = (Aspec + λAprod)2 we can compute the
total gain Gprod of producers by
Gprod ≡ −AAprod = − 1
2
∂H
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
.
The gain of speculators is obtained subtracting this con-
tribution and that of noise traders from the total gain
−σ2
Gspec = −σ2 + ηN −Gprod. (C9)
1. Replica calculation
The zero temperature behavior of the Hamiltonian H
can be studied with spin glass techniques [15,14]. We
introduce n replicas of the system, each with dynamical
variables si,c, labeled by replica indices c, d = 1, . . . , n.
Then we write replicated partition function:
〈Zn(β)〉 = Tr s
∏
µ,c
〈e− βP (Aµc )2〉a,b (C10)
where the average is over the disorder variables aµs,i, b
µ
i
and Tr s is the trace on the variables si,c for all i and
c. Following standard procedures [15,14], we introduce
a Gaussian variable zµc so that we can linearize the ex-
ponent in Eq. (C10). This allows us to carry out the
averages over a’s and b’s explicitly. Then we introduce
new variables Qc,d and rc,d with the identity
1 =
∫
dQc,dδ
(
Qc,d − 1
N
∑
i
si,dsi,d
)
∝
∫
drc,ddQc,de
−αβ
2
2
rc,d(NQc,d−
∑
i
si,csi,d)
for all c ≥ d, which allow us to write the partition func-
tion (to leading order in N) as:
〈Zn(β)〉 =
∫
dQˆdrˆe−NnβF (Qˆ,rˆ)
with
F (Qˆ, rˆ) =
α
2nβ
Tr log Tˆ +
αβ
2n
∑
c≤d
rc,dQc,d
− 1
nβ
log
[
Tr se
αβ2
2
∑
c≤d
rc,dscsd
]
. (C11)
The matrix Tˆ is given by
Ta,b = δa,b +
2β
α
[c+ ρ+ (1− c)Qa,b] .
For correlated producers we would have obtained the
same result but with ρ → ρ + ρ2Nǫ2, where ǫ measures
the bias of producers towards a particular action for a
given µ, or equivalently the correlation between the ac-
tions of two distinct producers. More precisely ǫ2 is the
average of bµi b
µ
j for i 6= j and for all µ. Therefore the
limit ρ → ∞ also corresponds to a small share of pro-
ducers ρ ≪ 1 with a small bias ǫ 6= 0. Note that a bias
ǫ ∼ √N corresponds indeed to ∼ N independent pro-
ducers. Equivalently ∼ √N correlated producers, with ǫ
finite are equivalent to ∼ N independent producers.
With the replica symmetric ansatz
Qc,d = q + (Q− q)δc,d, rc,d = 2r + (R − 2r)δc,d
the matrix Tˆ has n − 1 degenerated eigenvalues λ0 =
1 + 2(1−c)β(1−q)α and one eigenvalue equal to λ1 =
2β[c+ρ+(1−c)q]
α n + 1 +
2(1−c)β(1−q)
α therefore, after stan-
dard algebra,
F (RS)(q, r) =
α
2β
log
[
1 +
2(1− c)β(Q − q)
α
]
+
α[c+ ρ+ (1− c)q]
α+ 2(1− c)β(Q − q) +
αβ
2
(RQ − rq)
− 1
β
〈log
∫ 1
−1
dse−βVz(s)〉 (C12)
where we found it convenient to define the “potential”
Vz(s) = −αβ(R − r)
2
s2 −√αr z s (C13)
so that the last term of F (RS) looks like the free energy
of a particle in the interval [−1, 1] with potential Vz(s)
where z plays the role of disorder.
The saddle point equations are given by:
∂F (RS)
∂q
= 0 ⇒ r = 4(1− c)[c+ ρ+ (1− c)q]
[α+ 2(1− c)β(Q − q)]2 (C14)
∂F (RS)
∂Q
= 0 ⇒ β(R− r) = − 2(1− c)
α+ 2(1− c)β(Q − q) (C15)
∂F (RS)
∂R
= 0 ⇒ Q = 〈〈s2〉〉 (C16)
∂F (RS)
∂r
= 0 ⇒ β(Q− q) = 〈〈sz〉〉√
αr
(C17)
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where 〈〈·〉〉 stands for a thermal average over the above
mentioned one particle system.
In the limit β → 0 we can look for a solution with
q → Q and r → R. It is convenient to define
χ =
2(1− c)β(Q − q)
α
, and ζ = −
√
α
r
β(R − r)
(C18)
and to require that they stay finite in the limit β → ∞.
The averages are easily evaluated since, in this case, they
are dominated by the minimum of the potential Vz(s) =√
αr(ζs2/2 − zs) for s ∈ [−1, 1]. The minimum is at
s = −1 for z ≤ −ζ and at s = +1 for z ≥ ζ. For
−ζ < z < ζ the minimum is at s = z/ζ. With this we
find
〈〈sz〉〉 = 1
ζ
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
(C19)
and
〈〈s2〉〉 = Q = 1−
√
2
π
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
−
(
1− 1
ζ2
)
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
(C20)
With some more algebra, one easily finds:
χ =
[
α/erf
(
ζ√
2
)
− 1
]−1
(C21)
Finally ζ is fixed as a function of α by the equation√
2
π
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
+
(
1− 1
ζ2
)
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
+
α
ζ2
=
1 + ρ
1 − c (C22)
Note that ζ only depends on the combination (1+ρ)/(1−
c) which runs from 1 – for ρ = c = 0 i.e. no producers
and “perfect” speculators – to∞. The latter limit occurs
either if c→ 1, i.e. when speculators become producers,
or if ρ→∞ (many producers).
Eq. (C21) means that χ diverges when α→ αc(ρ, c)+,
which then implies that at the critical point
erf
(
ζ√
2
)
= α = αc. (C23)
This back in the other saddle point equations, yields the
following equation for ζ = ζc:√
2
π
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
+ erf
(
ζ√
2
)
=
1 + ρ
1 − c . (C24)
The free energy, at the saddle point, for β →∞, is
F (RS) =
c+ (1 − c)Q+ ρ
(1 + χ)2
(C25)
where Q and χ take their saddle point values Eqs. (C20)
and (C21).
The gain of producers, from Eq. (C12), is
Gprod
N
= − ρ
1 + χ
(C26)
and that of speculators is obtained from Eq. (C9).
At αc χ → ∞ so that F (RS) → 0. Note that the loss
of producers vanishes Lprod → 0 as α→ αc, whereas the
loss of speculators Lspec = (1 − Q)/2 is always positive
below αc.
The phase diagram is shown in figure 5. here we discuss
some limits.
APPENDIX D: THE SIGN MG
The original MG [1] is defined with payoffs
gi = −ai(t)signA(t) (D1)
Over a long period of time T , the change in ∆i(t) is given
by
∆i(t+ T )−∆i(t)
T
=
1
T
T−1∑
τ=t
ξ
µ(τ)
i signA(τ)
≃ 1
P
P∑
µ=1
[2Prob{A(τ) > 0|µ(τ) = µ} − 1] ξµi (D2)
Then, for any fixed µ, the relevant quantity is the prob-
ability that A(t) > 0, when µ(t) = µ. This can be com-
puted within our mean-field approximation: Indeed if
〈si〉 = mi we can regard si as a random variable with
distribution
P (si = ±1) = 1±mi
2
.
Then, the relation Aµ(t)(t) = Ωµ+
∑N
i=1 ξ
µ
i si implies that
we can consider Aµ as a Gaussian variable with variance
Var(Aµ) =
N∑
i=1
ξµi
2
(1 −m2i ) + ηN
This allows us to compute
Prob{A(τ) > 0|µ(τ) = µ} = 1
2
erfc
(
〈Aµ〉√
2Var(Aµ)
)
.
Note that close to the critical point αc, 〈Aµ〉 is very small
compared to Var(Aµ), which means that it is legitimate
to expand the erfc function to linear order. This gives us
back a linear minority game, but with
gi = − ai(t)A(t)√
2Var(Aµ)
. (D3)
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Note, then that when η increases the gains for each spec-
ulator decreases. This is actually true even away from
αc. It is indeed easy to check that 〈signA(t)〉 decreases
as η increases.
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